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T
he pleasures of life are worth nothing if one is not alive to experience
them. Through the twentieth century in the United States and other
high-income countries, growth in real incomes was accompanied by a
historically unprecedented decline in mortality rates that caused life expectancy at
birth to grow by nearly 30 years.
The value of reductions in mortality risk can be roughly estimated from
(admittedly heroic extrapolations of) differential wages in the labor market corre-
sponding to differentials in the risk of death across occupations. Applying this
methodology, Nordhaus (2002, p. 35) has calculated that “to a ﬁrst approximation,
the economic value of increases in longevity in the last hundred years is about as
large as the value of measured growth in nonhealth goods and services.” Falling
mortality has also usually meant better health for the living, so that people are also
living better, healthier, and longer lives than did their forebears. Murphy and
Topel (2005), who measure both the value of mortality decline and the beneﬁts of
better health for the living, estimate that, between 1970 and 2000, the annual value
of increased longevity was about half of conventionally measured national income.
Improvements in life expectancy in the United States have been matched by
similar improvements in other rich countries. Indeed, there has been a rapid
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Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 20, Number 3—Summer 2006—Pages 97–120convergence of older adult mortality rates since 1970 in rich countries, particularly
among men (Deaton, 2004, Figure 7). Outside of the rich countries, average health
is strongly correlated with income. As shown in Figure 1, the current version of a
graph ﬁrst drawn by Preston (1975) in which countries are represented by circles
and the size of the circle is proportional to population, life-expectancy is pro-
foundly lower for countries with lower levels of per capita income.
In the years just after World War II, life expectancy gaps between countries
were falling across the world. Poor countries enjoyed rapid increases in life-
expectancy in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, with the gains in some cases exceeding
an additional year of life expectancy per year. The HIV/AIDS epidemic and the
transition in Russia and eastern Europe have changed that situation. The best
estimates of life-expectancy in some sub-Saharan African countries are lower now
than they were in 1950. Life expectancy in Russia fell by nearly seven years over the
1990s. However, at least up to the 1990s, compound welfare measures that incor-
porate both health and income show both much greater inequality at any point in
time and much greater international convergence than do income measures alone
(Becker, Philipson and Soares, 2005).
There is also a positive relationship between income and health within
countries—low-income people live shorter lives than high-income people in a given
country. Americans in the bottom 5 percent of the income distribution in 1980 had
a life-expectancy at all ages that was about 25 percent lower than the corresponding
life-expectancies of those in the top 5 percent of the income distribution (Rogot,
Sorlie, Johnson and Schmitt, 1992). These “health inequalities,” also known as
Figure 1
The Preston Curve: Life Expectancy versus GDP Per Capita
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98 Journal of Economic Perspectivesgradients, are part of a wider pattern that relates mortality to measures of socio-
economic status. For example, American blacks had a life expectancy in 2002 that
was 5.4 years less than that of American whites. In England and Wales in 1997–2001,
male manual workers could expect to live 8.4 years less than professionals, a gap
that has increased since the early 1970s.
The decline in mortality over time, differences in mortality across countries
and differences in mortality across groups within countries are phenomena worthy
of serious attention by economists and others. We will ﬁrst lay out the historical
decline in mortality, then move to mortality differences between rich and poor
countries, and then discuss differences in mortality within countries. A good theory
of mortality should explain all of the facts we will outline. No such theory exists at
present, but at the end of the paper we will sketch a tentative synthesis.
Determinants of the Historical Decline in Mortality
For most of human history, life was properly described in the famous phrase of
Thomas Hobbes as “nasty, brutish, and short.” From the dawn of Homo sapiens
perhaps 100,000 years ago until the ﬁrst agricultural revolution in roughly 10,000
BCE, world population was about four million people. Life expectancy at birth for
our hunter–gatherer ancestors was perhaps 25 years. There had been little, if any,
progress by the Roman Empire, and even in 1700, life expectancy at birth in
England—after the Netherlands, the richest country in the world at the time—was
only 37 years (Wrigley and Schoﬁeld, 1981).
In the eighteenth century, mortality began to decline. In England and Wales
(which we refer to as “England” for convenience), the decline started around the
middle of the eighteenth century. By 1820, life expectancy at birth in England was
about 41 years, up six years over the previous century. Between 1820 and 1870, the
period of greatest industrialization, life expectancy remained stable at about
41 years. Since 1870, mortality has fallen relatively continuously as well as more
rapidly than in the ﬁrst phase of mortality decline. Life expectancy in England
climbed to 50 years in the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century, and is about 77
years today. A similar transition, with some moderate differences in timing, took
place in all developed countries. Mortality reduction in France was broadly similar
to that in England. In the United States, the mortality reduction appears to start
around 1790, with a similar overall pattern. Life expectancy at birth in the United
States rose from 47 years in 1900 to 78 years today.
The reduction in mortality was not uniform by age. The vast bulk of the
historical reduction in mortality occurred at younger ages. Figure 2 shows trends in
life expectancy by age in England since 1840. Between 1841 and 1950, life expect-
ancy at birth increased by 30 years, while life expectancy at age ten increased by
only half that amount. The decline in infectious disease explains this disparate age
pattern. In 1848, 60 percent of deaths in England were from infectious disease.
Between then and 1971, infectious disease mortality declined by 95 percent. Since
David Cutler, Angus Deaton and Adriana Lleras-Muney 99infants and children are the most vulnerable to infections, their mortality rates were
most affected by the decline in infections. The sources of the reduction in infec-
tious disease mortality have been extensively debated in the demographic commu-
nity. We discuss the relevant factors in (possible) order of historical importance and
conclude with some open issues.
Improved Nutrition
Agriculturalyieldsincreasedsigniﬁcantlyduringtheeighteenthcentury.Better-
fed people resist most bacterial (although not viral) disease better, and recover
more rapidly and more often. The British physician and demographer Thomas
McKeown was the ﬁrst person to argue for the importance of nutrition in improved
health, writing several seminal papers on the topic which culminated in his widely
read 1976 book. McKeown argued by residual analysis: neither personal health care
nor public health appeared to have had much impact prior to the 1900s, when most
of the mortality decline had already occurred. In a famous example, McKeown
showed that mortality from tuberculosis fell by 80 percent before there was any
effective treatment for the disease. The same is true for other infectious diseases as
well. However, many analysts found unconvincing both McKeown’s dismissal of
public health, as well as the argument by elimination that nutrition was the crucial
factor (for example, Szreter, 1988; Guha, 1994).
Direct evidence on the role of nutrition in improved health and mortality
reduction comes from the work of Robert Fogel, in a series of papers summarized
Figure 2
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100 Journal of Economic Perspectivesin Fogel (1997) and in his 2004 book. Fogel begins by showing the enormous
increase in caloric intake after the middle of the eighteenth century, measured
both directly from agricultural output and diary surveys, and indirectly through
changes in adult height. Between the middle of the eighteenth century and today,
for example, caloric intake per person increased by more than a third, and heights
in most of Europe increased by ten centimeters or more (Fogel, 1994, Table 1).
Mortality is U-shaped in the body mass index (weight divided by height squared),
and declines with height given the body mass index. Fogel (1997) uses these
relationships to argue that nearly all of the reduction in mortality from the late
eighteenth century to the late nineteenth century can be attributed to improved
nutrition, as well as half of the mortality improvement in the century after that.
But the evidence on calorie availability has not convinced everyone. One line
of argument is that the increase in life expectancy in England from 1750 to 1820
had nothing to do with increased income per head, but was just one of the
ﬂuctuations in mortality that characterized pre-industrial Europe. Indeed, Wrigley
and Schoﬁeld (1981) estimate that life expectancy in 1600 was the same as in 1820,
with 1750 being the low point of a two-century swing. Steckel (2004) argues on the
basis of skeletal remains that people were taller (and presumably better nourished)
in early medieval times. If we accept this argument and date the modern decrease
in mortality from 1870, when it began in earnest in England and several other
European countries, the link between economic growth and mortality becomes
tenuous, because the timing of the beginnings of modern growth is far more
dispersed across countries than is the onset of the modern mortality decline
(Easterlin, 2004). Also, as we shall see, improvements in public health offer a more
coherent explanation for mortality declines after 1870.
Another concern with the nutritional story is that, from the sixteenth to the
eighteenth centuries, English aristocrats had no life expectancy advantage over the
rest of the population, despite presumably better nutrition. Moreover, mortality was
not lower in well-fed populations of the same period, such as in the United States
(Livi-Bacci, 1991).
Further, there are powerful two-way interactions between disease and nutri-
tion. Children who are frequently malnourished often continually suffer from
poorly-controlled infectious disease. Diseases such as diarrhea prevent food intake
from nourishing the body; children who suffer repeated episodes of diarrhea may
be able to digest less than 80 percent of what they consume (Dasgupta and Ray,
1990). As a result, some argue that it was disease, not nutrition, that was the primary
exogenous inﬂuence, and that disease burdens changed most strongly as a result of
public health intervention.
Public Health
The argument for the role of public health in reduced mortality is made most
prominently by Samuel Preston (1975, 1980, 1996). If economic growth were the
sole reason for improved health, countries would move along the “Preston curve”
shown in Figure 1, but the curve itself would remain ﬁxed. However, even at a given
The Determinants of Mortality 101level of income, people live substantially longer today than they did in the past. For
example, China in 2000 has the income level of the United States in the 1880s, but
has the life expectancy of the United States in 1970—about 72 years. Preston
estimates that only about 15 percent of the increase in life expectancy between the
1930s and 1960s is a result of increases in income alone (Preston, 1975). While
income was certainly mismeasured historically, creating uncertainty in this esti-
mate, there is no recorded income in 1930 that would have predicted the life
expectancy observed in many countries in 1960.
Public health improvements are an obvious explanation for this shift. Macro
public health involves big public works projects: ﬁltering and chlorinating water
supplies, building sanitation systems, draining swamps, pasteurizing milk and un-
dertaking mass vaccination campaigns. Micro public health involves changes made
by individuals but encouraged by the public sector, including boiling bottles and
milk, protecting food from insects, washing hands, ventilating rooms and keeping
children’s vaccinations up to date. Macro public health was always present to some
extent. Even in the Middle Ages, it was known that people living in areas where
bubonic plague was rampant should be quarantined. (Unfortunately, rats were not
quarantined.) Benjamin Latrobe built a water system in Philadelphia early in the
nineteenth century, at least partly to reduce the disease burden. In 1854 John Snow
compared cholera fatalities between households supplied by two different water
companies, one of which was recycling human waste, and one of which was not. He
thus demonstrated that cholera was water-borne and that its spread could be halted
by uncontaminated water supplies. But big public health did not fully come into its
own until the acceptance of the germ theory of disease in the 1880s and 1890s,
which led to a wave of new public health initiatives and the conveyance of safe
health practices to individuals.
The dramatic reduction in water and food-borne diseases after that time—
typhoid, cholera, dysentery, and non-respiratory tuberculosis—highlights the role
of public health. From a mortality rate of 214 per 100,000 in 1848–54, these
diseases were virtually eliminated in the United States by 1970. By one estimate,
water puriﬁcation alone can explain half of the mortality reduction in the United
States in the ﬁrst third of the twentieth century (Cutler and Miller, 2005).
Urbanization
If rising living standards were good for health, urbanization was not, at least
initially. The preponderance of the evidence suggests that the lack of improvement
in mortality between 1820 and 1870 was due in large part to the greater spread of
disease in newly enlarged cities. Nutrition may or may not be the culprit here;
debate about whether nutrition and real wages were rising or falling in the middle
of the nineteenth century continues to rage. But the effect of unsanitary conditions
was larger and the spread of disease was easier in bigger, more crowded cities.
102 Journal of Economic PerspectivesVaccination
Prior to the twentieth century, there was little effective medical treatment for
infectious disease. Over the course of the twentieth century, however, the role of
medical advances increased in importance.
The ﬁrst important medical interventions were vaccinations. Variolation
against smallpox, practiced in China as early as the tenth century, was an early form
of immunization whereby matter from the scabs of previous victims was introduced
into the bodies of healthy people. Variolation was introduced to Europe from
Turkey and to the American colonies by African slaves in the early eighteenth
century. George Washington variolated his entire army. Vaccination was intro-
duced by Edward Jenner at the end of the eighteenth century, but wide-scale
research on vaccines depended on the germ theory of disease and did not occur
until a century later. Since the late nineteenth century, there have been a number
of new vaccines, including those for rabies (1885), plague (1897), diphtheria
(1923), pertussis (1926), tuberculosis (1927), tetanus (1927), yellow fever (1935),
polio (1955 and 1962), measles (1964), mumps (1967), rubella (1970), and hep-
atitis B (1981).
The morbidity consequences of these diseases were high, but the best available
historical data suggest that, in the now-rich countries, direct mortality from these
diseases was relatively rare immediately prior to introduction of these vaccines, except
for tuberculosis. As many as half a million people contracted measles in the United
States just before the vaccine was developed, for example, but measles directly ac-
counted for fewer than 1,000 deaths. Exclusive of tuberculosis, reductions in these
causes of death account for only 3 percent of the total mortality reduction. The
reduction in tuberculosis mortality is another 10 percent, but in the United States,
unlike most other countries, the tuberculosis vaccine has never been routinely used, so
none of the reduction was due to vaccination. These conclusions parallel those of
McKeown; the BCG vaccine for tuberculosis was widely used in Britain, but without any
evidence of an effect on trend mortality. Apart from polio, the same is true for the
introduction of other vaccines. Of course, the indirect consequences of eliminating
infectious diseases may be greater; people with measles may succumb more readily to
other diseases, for example. Evidence suggests there are indirect mortality effects for
some water-born diseases (Cutler and Miller, 2005), but the extent of such indirect
effects in the disease environment as a whole is not known.
Medical Treatments
Quantitatively more important for mortality was the development of new
therapeutics for people with disease. Figure 3 shows mortality for infectious diseases
and cardiovascular disease. Infectious disease declined greatly in the ﬁrst half of the
century, while cardiovascular disease mortality reductions were particularly impor-
tant after 1960.
Antibiotics, developed in the 1930s and 1940s, were the ﬁrst of the new wave
of medical therapies. Sulfa drugs and penicillin were the wonder drugs of their era.
By 1960, mortality from infectious diseases had declined to its current level.
David Cutler, Angus Deaton and Adriana Lleras-Muney 103More intensive medical interventions date in importance largely from the
post–World War II era, and are associated with a different cause of mortality. Since
1960, cardiovascular disease mortality has declined by over 50 percent, and cardio-
vascular disease mortality reductions account for 70 percent of the seven-year
increase in life expectancy between 1960 and 2000. Cutler (2004) matches the
results of clinical trials to actual mortality declines, and attributes the bulk of the
decline in cardiovascular disease mortality—as much as two-thirds of the reduc-
tion—to medical advance. Beyond medical advance, the major factor in reduced
cardiovascular disease mortality is the reduction in smoking. Smoking rates in the
United States have fallen to half their level at the time of the Surgeon General’s
1964 report on the harms of smoking. Continued public health campaigns against
tobacco use have been an important part of this decline.
An additional 19 percent of the increase in life expectancy since 1960 is a result
of reduced infant mortality. Cutler (2004) attributes a large share of continued
infant mortality reductions to improved neonatal medical care for low birth-weight
infants. The remainder of the decline in mortality since the 1960s includes reduced
mortality from external causes, primarily motor vehicle accidents, reduced mortal-
ity from pneumonia/inﬂuenza, and a slight decrease in cancer mortality.
The importance of medical technology and smoking behavior can also be seen
in the simultaneous decline and rapid convergence of mortality rates for all
developed countries, particularly for men, and particularly for cardiovascular dis-
ease. Smoking causes cardiovascular disease, with a relatively short lag, and lung
Figure 3
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104 Journal of Economic Perspectivescancer, with a much longer lag. In consequence, the increase in smoking among
men in the second quarter of the twentieth century contributed to the slowdown
in mortality decline in the third quarter of the century, and the reduction in
smoking, which is now widespread throughout the rich countries, is currently
acting in concert with technical progress in medicine. Women began to smoke
later than men, and have been slower to quit, and women’s smoking rates are
still rising in some European countries. As a result, the current gap between
men’s and women’s life expectancy is low by historical standards; the decline
and convergence of mortality from cardiovascular disease has been slower for
women than for men; and women’s mortality rate from lung cancer is still rising
in many countries, though it has recently reversed in some, including the
United States.
Some analysts would continue to give nutrition the primary role in reducing
life expectancy, even after 1870 and well into the twentieth century, rather than
public health and medical care. In most countries of the world, although not the
United States, people are continuing to get taller, and relationships that link
mortality to physical characteristics will predict much of the recent mortality
decline based on body size and function alone. Fogel (2004, p. 103) gives the
personal health care system much credit for reducing morbidity (hip replacement,
cataract surgery, and so on) but none for mortality decline: “The main thing that
physicians do is to make life more bearable: reduce morbidity and tell people how
to take care of themselves.”
The Long-Term Reach of Early-Life Factors
The “fetal origins” (or “womb with a view” hypothesis) of Barker (1990) posits
that in conditions of nutritional deﬁciency, the developing fetus will differentially
compromise functions that are operative only late in the life-cycle, beyond the
normal age of reproduction, thus maximizing the chances of survival through
reproductive ages and the number of offspring. The consequence for modern
populations is that better nutrition decades ago could be having its effect only
today.
The fetal origins theory is supported by the robust correlation between health
in adulthood and birth weight, a marker for in utero nutrition (though a relatively
poor one according to the theory, which stresses body shape more than weight),
even when controlling for current socioeconomic status. A more compelling ana-
lytical approach is to examine late-life health of children who were in utero during
famines. Children who survived in utero the brief Dutch famine at the end of World
War II had higher levels of risk factors associated with coronary heart disease at age
50, though this is not true of mortality from heart disease itself. By contrast, no
exposure effects were found for families in Finland in 1866–68 and in Leningrad
during the siege of World War II (for a review of these and other results, see
Rasmussen, 2001). Even if the theory is correct, it is likely that the effects of
nutritional improvements in utero on cardiovascular mortality in adulthood are
small compared to the effects of reductions in risk factors in adulthood.
The Determinants of Mortality 105The seasonality of life expectancy with respect to month of birth is another
type of evidence. Doblhammer and Vaupel (2001) have shown a relationship
between month of birth and longevity at age 50; those born in the northern
hemisphere in October to December live about as much as 0.6 year longer than
those born in April to June. As expected, the southern hemisphere is out of phase
with the northern hemisphere by six months. After examining alternative expla-
nations, such as selective infant mortality, these studies conclude the month-of-
birth effect is most likely due to the seasonal availability of fresh fruit, vegetables
and eggs to the pregnant mother in the ﬁrst and second trimesters.
After birth, the environment during childhood, including disease prevalence
and conditions at home, predicts the onset of disease in adulthood. For example,
Case, Fertig and Paxson (2005) use the data from the 1958 British birth cohort to
calculate that each chronic condition at age seven raises by 4 percent the proba-
bility of reporting a chronic condition at age 42; if the condition is still present at
16, the effect is twice as large. Lindeboom, Portrait and van der Berg (forthcoming)
look at cohorts born in Holland between 1812 and 1912 and ﬁnd that per capita
GDP up to age seven is associated with large effects on mortality at ages above 50;
in fact, the health effects from economic conditions at age seven are larger than the
effects of contemporaneous macroeconomic conditions at ages 50 and above.
Overall, childhood factors such as nutrition and the disease environment have
the potential to signiﬁcantly affect mortality at older ages, although the magnitude
is open to some debate. For this reason, some of the decline in mortality at the end
of the twentieth century might be attributable to improvements in diet and public
health many years ago, with the possibility of still more improvement to come.
Summary
Looking at this evidence as a whole, we see the history of mortality reduction
as encompassing three phases. The ﬁrst phase, from the middle of the eighteenth
century to the middle of the nineteenth century, is the one where improved
nutrition and economic growth may well have played a large role in health—
although this is hotly debated, and incipient public health measures were certainly
important as well. In the closing decades of the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth, the second phase occurred, in which public health mattered more—ﬁrst
negatively, because of high mortality in cities, then positively in the delivery of clean
water, removal of wastes, and advice about personal health practices. The third
phase, dating from the 1930s on, has been the era of big medicine, starting with
vaccination and antibiotics, and moving on to the expensive and intensive personal
interventions that characterize the medical system today.
Determinants of Mortality in Poor Countries
Life expectancy is much lower and mortality rates are much higher in poor
countries than in rich countries, as shown in Figure 1 and Table 1. There are also
106 Journal of Economic Perspectivesmarked differences in who dies and from what. In poor countries, 30 percent of
deaths are among children, compared with less than 1 percent among rich coun-
tries. In rich countries, most deaths are from cancers and from cardiovascular
diseases; in poor countries, most deaths are from infectious diseases. Most of these
diseases are but a historical memory in rich countries; today they kill people in poor
countries almost exclusively.
Yet there have been enormous improvements in life expectancy over the last
half century in today’s poor countries. In India and China, life expectancies have
risen by nearly 30 years since 1950 and, even in Africa, where there has been much
less economic progress, life expectancy rose by more than 13 years from the early
1950s to the late 1980s, before declining in the face of HIV/AIDS. The worldwide
decline in mortality after the World War II happened because 200 years worth of
progress against mortality in the now-rich countries was rapidly brought to bear on
mortality in the rest of the world. Measures such as improvements in water supply,
Table 1
The Worldwide Structure of Mortality in 2002
Treatments/Prevention World
Low-
income
countries
High-
income
countries
Deaths per 100,000 916 1,113 846
Percent of total deaths by age
Children (0–4) 18.4% 30.2% 0.9%
Elderly (60) 50.8 34.2 75.7
Percentage of deaths from chronic diseases
Cancer Partially preventable and
treatable
12.4 6.3 26.2
Cardiovascular disease Partially preventable and
treatable
29.3 21.5 38.1
Numbers of deaths, millions
Respiratory infections* Antibiotics 3.96 2.90 0.34
HIV/AIDS Anti-retroviral therapy 2.78 2.14 0.02
Perinatal deaths* Pre- and post-natal care 2.46 1.83 0.03
Diarrheal diseases* Oral rehydration therapy 1.80 1.54 —
Tuberculosis Preventable with public
health; usually
treatable
1.57 1.09 0.01
Malaria* Partially preventable;
treatable
1.27 1.24 —
DPT/Polio/Measles* Vaccinations 1.12 1.07 —
Source: Based on WHO data and subject to large margins of error, particularly for adult mortality in low-
income countries, most of which lack complete vital registration systems.
Notes: DPT stands for diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough) and tetanus. An asterisk (*) indicates that
the disease is most commonly fatal in children, except respiratory disease in high-income countries.
— indicates less than 10,000 deaths. “Low-income” and “high-income” are World Bank designations of
countries; these can be thought of as corresponding to below $5,000 PPP and above $10,000 PPP in
Figure 1. Perinatal deaths are deaths in the ﬁrst seven days of life and are primarily associated with low
birth weight.
David Cutler, Angus Deaton and Adriana Lleras-Muney 107cleansing the environment of disease vectors (like anopheles mosquitoes that carry
malaria or rats that carry lice), the use of antibiotics and the widespread immuni-
zation of children—the combined development of which had taken many years in
the West—were introduced to the rest of the world over a relatively very short span
of time. Because those who had previously died were mostly children, and because
subsequent reductions in fertility followed only slowly (and in some countries not
at all), this rapid deployment of life-saving public health led to the population
explosion of the last half century.
Table 1 shows that there is a great deal more to be done before health in poor
countries resembles that in rich countries today. As is also clear from the table, the
problem is not primarily lack of suitable treatments. Diarrheal disease and respi-
ratory infections—the ﬁrst and fourth leading causes of death worldwide—are
easily and cheaply treatable, with oral rehydration therapy (a mixture of salts and
sugar that stops the dehydration that kills children with diarrhea) and with antibi-
otics. Malaria has been fully controlled in the rich world by environmental mea-
sures and can arguably be controlled by similar measures—although it will certainly
be more difﬁcult in low-income countries given the more difﬁcult environmental
conditions—or by the use of insecticide-impregnated bed nets in those countries.
(Induced evolutionary changes in the anopheles mosquitoes will eventually make
ineffective any given insecticide, and the outcome of the resulting arms race is
unclear.) Cheap and effective antibiotics exist for most kinds of tuberculosis,
though therapy must be maintained for a considerable period of time. The infec-
tious “children’s diseases” of whooping cough, tetanus, polio, diphtheria and
measles kill more than a million children each year, and all have been eliminated
in rich countries by nearly universal immunization. Deaths within the ﬁrst seven
days of life are rare in the West, where pre- and post-natal health care are routinely
available, but common in the rest of the world. The anti-retroviral drugs that have
controlled mortality from HIV/AIDS in the rich world are expensive and not
generally available in sub-Saharan Africa, not even in South Africa which is by far
the wealthiest country in the region.
Of course, the fact that treatments already exist for many conditions does not
deny that new technology could be valuable. It is speculated that vaccines could be
developed for many of the key killers in developing countries (especially AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria; see Kremer, 2002), which would make disease prevention
much easier. Easier-to-use therapies could also be important, to the extent that the
difﬁculty of using therapies such as anti-retroviral medications explains their low
use. However, cheap and easy-to-administer treatments that are already available for
many diseases are not being used.
These diseases themselves are the result of other risk factors and disease
exposures. The World Health Organization (2003) has identiﬁed a set of risk
factors for mortality in poor countries. Included in the risks are unsafe sex (cer-
tainly important for HIV/AIDS), unsafe drinking water (one cause of diarrheal
disease) and a variety of other factors such as malnutrition and indoor smoke from
burning solid fuels (important in respiratory conditions). This list of underlying
108 Journal of Economic Perspectivesfactors is—more or less—the right one, but the quantitative magnitude of the
particular factors is unknown. In thinking about ways to improve health in poor
countries, we focus less on particular risk factors and more on the overall medical
and economic environment that can affect those factors.
Health delivery is often of low quality in both public and private sectors.
Absenteeism among medical staff is often a problem (with a third or more not
showing up for work), particularly in rural areas (Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer,
Muralidharan, and Rogers, 2005). Recent surveys in India have shown that, while
public doctors are more likely to be qualiﬁed, they are also more likely to be absent
and to have insufﬁcient time or medicines to provide effective treatment. Private
providers are often ill-qualiﬁed, and face competitive pressure to overtreat: for
example by giving everyone an injection of antibiotics without any prior testing
(Das and Hammer, 2004). Countries which are unable to provide effective public
health care are often also those that do not have the institutional ability to regulate
and to monitor the private sector. At the same time, many countries spend so little
on health care that, no matter how organized, it is unlikely to be effective.
Paradoxically, many consumers in these low-income countries report that they
are well-satisﬁed even with objectively unsatisfactory provision, so that there is little
political demand for improvement. Whatever the reasons, many countries cannot
deliver the cheap, effective, and widely available drugs that currently exist—a fact
often used as a counterargument against those blaming antiretroviral-drug patents
for the lack of success in treating HIV/AIDS in Africa.
Many of the most successful health programs in poor countries—such as
immunization campaigns, the (successful) eradication of smallpox and the (close
to successful) eradication of polio—have been “vertical” campaigns run from
outside the country by international organization such as the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) or UNICEF. Some critics argue that, although these programs
have been successful, they have also done little to improve (and may bid resources
away from) the domestic health care systems on which further progress in reducing
mortality may arguably depend. However, it seems unlikely that health inputs
would be so inelastic in the long run. More consequentially, there is some evidence
that the international immunization campaigns have run out of steam in recent
years. They are less well-funded than in the past, and past campaigns may have
successfully targeted the easiest-to-reach segments of the population (Bloom, Can-
ning and Weston, 2005). Perhaps in consequence, there has been a worldwide
slowdown in the rate of reduction of infant mortality in the 1990s compared with
the 1980s (Ahmad, Lopez and Inoue, 2000).
Broader social factors are also important for reductions in mortality. In his
pioneering work, Preston (1980) attributed about half of the gain in life expectancy
in developing countries (excluding China) from the 1930s to the late 1960s to the
combined effects of changes in income, literacy and the supply of calories, al-
though the last was not signiﬁcant in his regressions. He attributed the rest of the
gain to the public health measures newly implemented in the third world, although
he recognized the difﬁculties of attribution, if only because of likely interactions;
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health measures.
The importance of education, particularly women’s education, has been con-
ﬁrmed in many subsequent studies. The importance of women’s education is likely
a result of the fact that, as primary caretakers, women are most likely to implement
the behaviors that can improve their children’s health. To the extent that educa-
tion improves an individual’s ability to undertake these changes, more educated
mothers will have healthier babies.
The role of economic growth in health improvements in poor countries has
been as controversial as it is in the history of mortality decline. If Figure 1 were a
causal relationship, it would show that the effects of income on health are strong
at low levels of income, where absolute deprivation (including lack of food and
clean water) is common. Such income-based explanations emphasize the nutri-
tional factors brought up in the historical account, as well as the fact that higher
income makes it easier to provide the infrastructure of public health, such as water
and sanitation. In recent years, a number of authors have followed Pritchett and
Summers (1996) and argued from cross-country regressions that income is more
important than any other factor, and have endorsed policies that downplay the role
of any deliberate public action in health improvement. According to this view, if
countries are growing, the health of their inhabitants will look after itself. As was
certainly intended, Pritchett and Summers’s title, “Wealthier is Healthier,” has
become a banner under which some economists defend economic liberalization
against claims by the public health community and others that it has harmed
health.
Yet the cross-country data show almost no relationship between changes in life
expectancy and economic growth over 10-, 20-, or 40-year periods between 1960
and 2000. Many countries have shown remarkable improvements in health with
little or no economic growth, and vice versa. For the two largest countries, India
and China, there is a negative correlation between decadal rates of economic
growth and progress in reducing infant and child mortality. Almost all of China’s
remarkable post–World War II reduction in infant mortality happened prior to the
acceleration in economic growth after 1980, after which there was relatively little
progress in child health. Similarly, in India, the acceleration of the rate of growth
after the economic reforms in the early 1990s was accompanied by a slowdown in
the rate of decline in infant mortality (Dre `ze and Sen, 2002, chapter 4). Dre `ze and
Sen also argue that the slowdown in progress in China was a direct result of the
change in policy and the switch in resources that generated the growth.
As with the historical record, then, the cross-country evidence does not suggest
that economic growth will improve health without deliberate public action. This
may seem paradoxical if only because income brings so many things that favor
better health for the poor: better nutrition, better housing, the ability to pay for
health care, as well as the means for the public provision of clean water and
sanitation. There are a number of possible hypotheses as to why income is not more
important. As we have seen in the historical account, income growth and health are
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accompanied by urbanization in much of the poor world, and with some of the
same consequences that attended urbanization in Europe. This seems unlikely to
be the explanation for India or China, however.
More importantly, nutrition and housing may have limited effects without
macro public health measures, which require political action. Income can only buy
so much if the disease burden is overwhelming. Some rapidly growing economies
have not provided a good public health environment—indeed, have substituted
away from it in their attempt to promote economic growth. Other countries that
rely on more of a command and control economic system have used their com-
mand over labor to undertake public health measures that might not be feasible in
a more democratic state. Examples from China range from the coerced mobiliza-
tion of whole villages to deal with health threats or pests, such as mosquitoes, to the
one-child policy itself. Similarly, Cuba has a program of local doctors that is the
envy of many countries, even as its overall economy is in shambles. Ironically, the
weakness of their economy as a whole may make it easier for some countries to
afford the distribution of resources to health care.
Finally, and on the opposite side of the argument, there is an old view, recently
endorsed by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), that improvements in health technol-
ogy and the associated reduction in child mortality should reduce GDP per head, at
least temporarily, if health innovations result in large increases in population. Since
economic growth and health improvements are almost uncorrelated in the data,
the negative effects of health improvements through increased population must
have been almost completely offset by some positive effect of economic growth on
health. If this story is right, growth does indeed improve health, but the effect has
been hidden for much of the post–World War II period by the negative effects of
population growth on income per head.
Determinants of Mortality within Countries
A vast literature shows that individuals with low income, low wealth, low
education, or low social status often die younger than those who are better off or
better educated; and this is true for many countries and for many (if not all)
periods. The British census of 1851 showed differences in mortality across (occu-
pationally deﬁned) social classes, with those in lower (manual) classes having
higher mortality than skilled workers or professionals (Macintyre, 1997). More
recently, the famous study of Whitehall civil servants in Britain shows a difference
in mortality rates across groups deﬁned by their civil-service ranks (Marmot et al.,
1991); all-cause mortality diminishes with rank, as does mortality from most causes,
although the effects are much stronger for cardiovascular disease than for cancer.
In the United States, an array of studies has found similar patterns by income,
education, and race (for a compendium, see Rogers, Hummer and Nam, 2000).
The National Longitudinal Mortality Study, which matches death certiﬁcates with
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correlations between both education and income and mortality (Elo and Preston,
1996), as well as correlations between mortality and race, urban/rural residence,
and other factors.
These socioeconomic differences in health extend even to babies. White
infants of mothers with less than twelve years of education have a mortality rate that
is twice as high as that of white infants of mothers with a college degree (10 per
1,000 versus less than 5 per 1,000). Infants of black mothers have higher mortality
rates than whites for every education level—furthermore, children of black mothers
with a college degree have higher mortality rates than children of white high school
dropouts (Pamuk, Makuc, Heck, Ruben and Lochner, 1998, Figure 9). Income
gradients in nonfatal health begin in early childhood, and grow larger as the child
moves into adulthood (Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002).
Similar “gradients”—the term is used to emphasize that there are “graded”
differences in health running across ranked groups, not just between poor and
rich—are found in Canada and in European countries. Although data on adult
mortality are lacking in many poor countries, the World Bank has documented a
strong negative link between infant and child mortality and an index of living
standards based on the ownership of durable goods, and sometimes more directly
on income or consumption. In most places, mortality differences by social class are
particularly well-deﬁned for cardiovascular disease and for lung cancer. Mortality
differences are a good deal less sharp for other cancers, and are reversed for breast
cancer in women, where highly educated, high-income women are more likely
to die.
The elimination or at least reduction of differences in health by income, race
or geography has become a major focus of health policy in many countries,
including the United States and Britain. Our concern here is why these inequalities
exist and whether their existence is consistent with our accounts of historical and
contemporaneous mortality decline, and with differences in mortality between rich
and poor countries.
Medical Care
One possible answer is that those with high incomes receive more health care.
Health insurance is related to income in the United States, and while health care
coverage is universal in most other countries, better and less well off have access to
different physicians and sometimes hospitals. For example, in the United States,
standards of care appear to be lower in hospitals that mostly treat blacks (Bach et
al., 2004; Skinner, Chandra, Staiger, Lee and McClellan, 2005).
But access to health care cannot explain everything. As several studies show,
including the Whitehall study in the United Kingdom and the Health and Retire-
ment Study in the United States, the incidence of adverse health conditions is higher
among those of lower rank or lower education, even before the health care system
has become involved. Moreover, some large changes in access to health care have
had only minor effects on health gradients. The introduction of Medicare in 1965
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2005), and no effect on U.S. relative to British mortality rates for the relevant age
groups (Deaton and Paxson, 2004). Strikingly, Britain’s class-based differences in
health survived the introduction of the National Health Service after World War II.
Resources
An alternative theory of resources is that money matters because of the
non–health care things it can buy. This theory may have made more sense in the
past, when adequate food, clothing and shelter were constant struggles, but it
makes less sense today, at least in rich countries. Indeed, access to cheap food is a
risk factor for poor health in the United States and many countries (Cutler, Glaeser
and Shapiro, 2003). There is no evidence that, as living standards rise, the health
gradient disappears. In fact, according to some measures, health gradients appear
to be increasing in both the United States and Europe.
Differences in Health-Related Behaviors
More educated people are less likely to smoke, and this difference has in-
creased over time; between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, the difference in
prevalence of smoking between high-school graduates and college graduates grew
from about 9 percentage points to 15.5 percentage points (Pamuk, Makuc, Heck,
Reuben and Lochner, 1998). Smoking is a substantial factor in differences in lung
cancer and cardiovascular disease mortality across education groups. Drinking,
exercise, eating habits, use of preventive care (such as annual mammography),
adherence to therapy, and other health behaviors are also correlated with measures
of socioeconomic status (Adler et al., 1994; Goldman and Smith, 2002).
But again, observed behavior is not everything. Health gradients by socioeco-
nomic status persist even when differences in smoking, drinking, and other factors
are taken into account (Marmot, 1994). In the study of Whitehall civil servants,
looking at nonsmokers only eliminates the mortality differences between the top
and bottom groups for lung cancer but not for coronary heart disease. Over a ten
year follow-up, the mortality ratio between the top and bottom group was reduced
from 2.7 times to just over twice by adjusting for a range of risk factors, including
smoking. In the United States, non-Hispanic Caucasian Americans are more likely
than blacks to have ever smoked or to have smoked heavily (Rogers, Hummer and
Nam, 2000, p. 245), so smoking does nothing to help explain the black–white
differences in U.S. mortality patterns.
Moreover, a behavioral explanation for gradients in mortality does nothing to
explain why people from different socioeconomic groups behave differently. Eco-
nomic theories of differences in health behaviors across groups (pioneered by
Grossman, 1972) are generally based on differences in information, prices, the
value of long life, or discount rates. Information differences between those of
different socioeconomic status are an easy explanation, but less promising when
examined closely; to take but one example, knowledge about the harms of smoking
is nearly universal in the United States. Prices, too, are similar for rich and poor.
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Outside of economics, the currently dominant theory of health differentials is
that the poor health of low status individuals is caused by “psychosocial stress”—the
wear and tear that comes from subordinate status and from having little control
over one’s own life. This account is heavily inﬂuenced by both the Whitehall
evidence, and by accounts of rank and health within other primates. For example,
Sapolsky’s work on baboons in Kenya (1993) shows that subordinate baboons have
worse levels of various markers of chronic stress, such as glucocorticoids, and are in
poorer health. Furthermore, the stress-related symptoms emerge after hierarchies
become established and change when the hierarchy changes, suggesting they are
related to an individual’s rank rather than to ﬁxed individual characteristics such as
genetic traits.
Some biological evidence supports this theory. The mechanism that helps
animals deal with stress in the wild, “the ﬂight–ﬁght response,” is a series of
short-run responses that help save the animal’s life from an immediate threat, at the
expense of other functions relevant for long-term survival. Individuals who are in
low-status and subordinate situations, who are subject to arbitrary demands by
others, or who are discriminated against because of their race, are continually
having these biochemical responses triggered in a way that eventually causes
permanent malfunction, a buildup of what is known as “allostatic load” (Seeman,
Singer, Rowe, Horwitz and McEwen, 1997). This cumulative distress leads to an
increased probability of disease, particularly cardiovascular disease.
One concern with this work is that the concept of socioeconomic status is often
a convenient catchall for a range of variables—including income, education, oc-
cupation and race—but it is not helpful for thinking about how these variables
might have separate effects on health. Nor is grouping these variables together
helpful for policy analysis, which requires knowing which variables to alter.
A second concern is that the relationship between socioeconomic status and
health must work in both directions. Income is a case in point—there is substantial
evidence that poor health leads to low income, rather than the other way around.
In the United States and elsewhere, ill-health is a leading reason for retirement
(Smith, 1999, 2005) or for dropping out of the labor force (Case and Deaton,
2003), each of which are typically accompanied by a substantial drop in income.
Conditional on education, which acts as a form of protection against new episodes
of illness, changes in income do not predict changes in health, and lagged income
does not predict future incidence of ill health (Smith, 2003; Adams, Hurd, McFad-
den, Merrill and Ribeiro, 2003). Similarly, if income were the main factor, it would
be difﬁcult to explain why mortality fell most rapidly in the United States in the
period after 1970, during which median real income growth had slowed to a crawl,
or why it is that different European countries, with different economic perfor-
mance in the post–World War II period, should have such convergent experiences
of mortality decline (Deaton, 2004; Deaton and Paxson, 2004). The behavior of
health and income over the business cycle is also inconsistent with a strong effect
of income on health; Ruhm (2000) documents that recessions actually improve
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smoke or engage in other health-damaging activities during downturns.
The effects of education are more consistent than the effects of income with
theories that health is determined by socioeconomic status. Looking at the United
States, Currie and Moretti (2003) ﬁnd that women in counties where colleges
opened were more likely to attend college and had healthier babies. Lleras-Muney
(2005) ﬁnds that the populations of states that ﬁrst enacted compulsory schooling
laws subsequently lived longer; Oreopolous (2003) also ﬁnds that increases in
minimum schooling laws in England and Ireland improved the health of the
population. Also, as noted earlier, maternal education is strongly inversely corre-
lated with infant and child mortality in developing countries.
Education is likely to provide general human capital that can be used to
maintain and improve health in a wide range of circumstances. As emphasized by
the “fundamental causes” literature (Link and Phelan, 1995), educational differ-
ences (like other forms of power differences) will maintain a gradient in health
whenever there exists a mechanism or technology that more knowledgeable and
educated people can use to improve their health. Such explanations, unlike psy-
chosocial stress, help to explain shifting gradients over time in speciﬁc diseases—
for example, that lung cancer and cardiovascular disease were once relatively more
common among the relatively more educated population. The explanation also
predicts that, if breast cancer screening becomes more effective, it will diminish or
reverse the current gradient where highly educated women are more likely to die
of breast cancer (Link, Northbridge, Phelan and Ganz, 1998).
But as was the case for income, there is also evidence of a reverse relationship
running from health to education, certainly among children, and poor health in
childhood may predict poor health later. Case, Fertig and Paxson (2005) ﬁnd that
children who experienced poor health in childhood entered adulthood with
signiﬁcantly lower educational achievement. Miguel and Kremer (2004) and Bleak-
ley (2002) ﬁnd that provision of deworming drugs signiﬁcantly improved schooling
in contemporary Kenya and the pre–World War II American South, respectively.
But it is not clear how much of the observed relationship between education and
health in adulthood can be explained by the fact that children in poor health
obtain fewer years of schooling.
Summary
The link between social status and health is complex, perhaps too complex for
a single explanation. It seems clear that much of the link between income and
health is a result of the latter causing the former, rather than the reverse. There is
most likely a direct positive effect of education on health. While the exact mech-
anism underlying this link is unclear, stress and the differential use of health
knowledge and technology are almost certainly important parts of the explanation.
These cross-sectional ﬁndings have implications for our time-series analysis as
well. If better education leads to better health, some of the post-1970 decrease in
mortality in the United States and elsewhere might be attributable to the large
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attributed to medical care.
Conclusion
What sense can we make of all of these disparate accounts in different contexts,
and what can we expect for the path of mortality in the future? There is no
consensus on these issues. Here, we hazard our own best guess, recognizing that the
evidence is weak or missing for many of the links in our argument.
Knowledge, science and technology are the keys to any coherent explanation.
Mortality in England began to decline in the wake of the Enlightenment, directly
through the application to health of new ideas about personal health and public
administration, and indirectly through increased productivity that permitted (al-
beit with some terrible reversals) better levels of living, better nutrition, better
housing and better sanitation. Ideas about the germ theory of disease were critical
to changing both public health infrastructure and personal behavior. Similarly,
knowledge about the health effects of smoking in the middle of the twentieth
century has had profound effects on behavior and on health. Most recently, the
major life-saving scientiﬁc innovations in medical procedures and new pharmaceu-
ticals have had a major effect, particularly on reduced mortality from cardiovascular
disease. There have also been important health innovations whose effect has been
mainly in poor countries: for example, the development of freeze-dried serums that
can be transported without refrigeration, and of oral rehydration therapy for
preventing the death of children from diarrhea.
Perhaps controversially, we tend to downplay the role of income. Over the
broad sweep of history, improvements in health and income are both the conse-
quence of new ideas and new technology, and one might or might not cause the
other. Between rich and poor countries, health comes from institutional ability and
political willingness to implement known technologies, neither of which is an
automatic consequence of rising incomes. Within countries, the lower earnings of
people who are sick explain much of the correlation between income and health,
rather than a causal relationship from higher income to better health.
There seems no reason to suppose that the ﬂow of health-enhancing knowl-
edge and technology will slow. Indeed, there are enormous incentives for the
discovery of new basic health-enhancing knowledge, as well as for the development
of new drugs and new medical treatments. Richer people are prepared to pay more
for longer lives, and people who live longer are prepared to pay more to cure
diseases, such as Alzheimer’s, that few people used to live long enough to contract.
Of course, the pace of progress is hard to predict. Optimistic assessments can sound
truly fantastic. Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) show that in the 160 years from 1840, life
expectancy in the leading country or region of the world has increased by three
months per calendar year. If this trend continues, the leading country will have a
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the United States will get there before the century is out.
However, changes in knowledge, science and technology will often increase
the gradient in health, at least for a time. There was no health gradient between
English aristocrats and ordinary people prior to the Enlightenment, but one
developed soon thereafter, so that average life expectancy and the gap between rich
and poor rose together. There was no gradient in infant mortality between the
children of physicians and non-physicians prior to an understanding of the germ
theory of disease. More educated people quit smoking faster after the health
consequences were understood. Our hypothesis is that greater speed of introduc-
tion of new health-relevant knowledge and technology will tend to raise the health
gradient, a hypothesis that is consistent with rising gradients in rich countries in the
recent past.
If our analysis of the gradient is correct, our prediction of an acceleration in
the production of new knowledge and new treatments is likely to make the health
gradient steeper, with increasing gaps across educational and social class (occupa-
tional) groups, and possibly race as well. Gaps between countries may also widen.
The incentives for research and discovery are much weaker or absent for the
diseases, such as malaria or tuberculosis, that are largely conﬁned to the poor of the
world. Even when treatment is available in rich countries, there is no guarantee that
it can be made available elsewhere, as we have learned during the AIDS pandemic
and indeed from the several million people who die each year from vaccine-
preventable diseases. Steepening gradients within and between nations are likely to
provoke much soul-searching, and it is clearly an appropriate aim of public policy
to improve equality of access for everyone to new, life-saving technologies. Yet, if we
are right, increases in the gradient also have a silver lining. They indicate that help
is on the way, not only for those who receive it ﬁrst, but eventually for everyone.
y A longer version of this paper, which includes an extended bibliography, is available as a
National Bureau of Economic Research working paper at http://www.nber.org.W ea r e
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